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We present a new methodology for computing approximate Nash equilibria for two-person non-cooperative games based upon certain extensions and specializations of an existing optimization approach previously used for the derivation of fixed…
We propose a framework to compute approximate Nash equilibria in integer programming games with nonlinear payoffs, i.e., simultaneous and non-cooperative games where each player solves a parametrized mixed-integer nonlinear program. We…
We consider the problem of learning sparse polymatrix games from observations of strategic interactions. We show that a polynomial time method based on $\ell_{1,2}$-group regularized logistic regression recovers a game, whose Nash…
While there have been a number of studies about the efficacy of methods to find exact Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, there has been little empirical work on finding approximate Nash equilibria. Here we provide such a study that compares…
Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding…
In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et al. on the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium with logarithmic support size. Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads to the following contributions: 1. For…
The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The…
We describe a new complete algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum games, based on a quadratically-constrained feasibility program formulation. We demonstrate that the algorithm runs significantly faster than the…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
We study the randomized query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria (ANE) in large games. We prove that, for some constant $\epsilon>0$, any randomized oracle algorithm that computes an $\epsilon$-ANE in a binary-action, $n$-player game…
We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty actions per player. This is the first PPAD hardness result for a game with a constant number of actions per player where the interaction graph…
In this paper, we first devise two algorithms to determine whether or not a bimatrix game has a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If so, we propose an algorithm that computes the strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If a given…
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…
We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our…
We study the computational complexity of computing or approximating a quasi-proper equilibrium for a given finite extensive form game of perfect recall. We show that the task of computing a symbolic quasi-proper equilibrium is…
We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…