Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games
Computer Science and Game Theory
2007-10-31 v1 Computational Complexity
Discrete Mathematics
Abstract
We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games with many players but few strategies. We show that any such game has an approximate pure Nash equilibrium, computable in polynomial time, with approximation O(s^2 L), where s is the number of strategies and L is the Lipschitz constant of the utilities. Finally, we show that there is a PTAS for finding an epsilon
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.0710.5582,
title = {Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games},
author = {Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos Papadimitriou},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0710.5582},
year = {2007}
}