An Efficient PTAS for Two-Strategy Anonymous Games
Abstract
We present a novel polynomial time approximation scheme for two-strategy anonymous games, in which the players' utility functions, although potentially different, do not differentiate among the identities of the other players. Our algorithm computes an -approximate Nash equilibrium of an -player 2-strategy anonymous game in time , which significantly improves upon the running time required by the algorithm of Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2007. The improved running time is based on a new structural understanding of approximate Nash equilibria: We show that, for any , there exists an -approximate Nash equilibrium in which either only players randomize, or all players who randomize use the same mixed strategy. To show this result we employ tools from the literature on Stein's Method.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.0812.2277,
title = {An Efficient PTAS for Two-Strategy Anonymous Games},
author = {Constantinos Daskalakis},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0812.2277},
year = {2008}
}