Related papers: Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticult…
We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy…
Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…
Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we…
An edge coalition in a graph $G=(V,E)$ consists of two disjoint sets of edges $E_1$ and $E_2$, neither of which is an edge dominating set but whose union $E_1\cup E_2$ is an edge dominating set. An edge coalition partition in a graph $G$ of…
The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…
Given a graph $G = (V, E)$, a non-empty set $S \subseteq V$ is a defensive alliance, if for every vertex $v \in S$, the majority of its closed neighbours are in $S$, that is, $|N_G[v] \cap S| \geq |N_G[v] \setminus S|$. The decision version…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
\noindent A paired coalition in a graph $G=(V,E)$ consists of two disjoint sets of vertices $V_1$ and $V_2$, neither of which is a paired dominating set but whose union $V_1 \cup V_2$ is a paired dominating set. A paired coalition partition…
This paper studies a significant problem in green networking called switching off base stations in case of cooperating service providers by means of stochastic geometric and coalitional game tools. The coalitional game herein considered is…
The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…
In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, application of a repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others' packets, so that the network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such…
Security games model strategic interactions in adversarial real-world applications. Such applications often involve extremely large but highly structured strategy sets (e.g., selecting a distribution over all patrol routes in a given…
In studies of social dynamics, cohesion refers to a group's tendency to stay in unity, which -- as argued in sociometry -- arises from the network topology of interpersonal ties between members of the group. We follow this idea and propose…
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…
For a graph $G=(V,E)$, a pair of vertex disjoint sets $A_{1}$ and $A_{2}$ form a connected coalition of $G$, if $A_{1}\cup A_{2}$ is a connected dominating set, but neither $A_{1}$ nor $A_{2}$ is a connected dominating set. A connected…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
A vertex subset M of a graph G is a multipacking if for each vertex v, and each positive integer s less than or equal to the diameter of G, v is within distance s of at most s vertices of M. The multipacking number of a graph is the maximum…