Related papers: Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticult…
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…
LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of cores of games, right from the early days of this notion to the present time. The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} introduced the "right" way of…
We give the first analysis of the computational complexity of {\it coalition structure generation over graphs}. Given an undirected graph $G=(N,E)$ and a valuation function $v:2^N\rightarrow\RR$ over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to…
We consider a restricted game on weighted graphs associated with minimum partitions. We replace in the classical definition of Myerson restricted game the connected components of any subgraph by the sub-components obtained with a specific…
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…
We study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities in the introduced family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games. A non-cooperative game embeds a coalition structure formation mechanism, and…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
We give a column generation based branch and bound algorithm for coalition structure generation over graphs problem using valuation functions for which this problem is proven to be NP-complete. For a given graph G = (V;E) and a valuation…
We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the…
The coalition in a graph $G$ consists of two disjoint sets of vertices $V_{1}$ and $V_{2}$, neither of which is a dominating set but whose union $V_{1}\cup V_{2}$, is a dominating set. A coalition partition in a graph $G$ is a vertex…
Let $G(V, E)$ be a finite, simple, isolate-free graph. A set $D$ of vertices of a graph $G$ with the vertex set $V$ is a double dominating set of $G$, if every vertex $v\in D$ has at least one neighbor in $D$ and every vertex $v \in V…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We propose a novel decision making framework for forming potential collaboration among otherwise competing agents in subsurface systems. The agents can be, e.g., groundwater, CO$_2$, or hydrogen injectors and extractors with conflicting…
Independent set games are cooperative games defined on graphs, where players are edges and the value of a coalition is the maximum cardinality of independent sets in the subgraph defined by the coalition. In this paper, we investigate the…
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a…
For a subset $S$ of vertices in a graph $G$, a vertex $v \in S$ is an enclave of $S$ if $v$ and all of its neighbors are in $S$, where a neighbor of $v$ is a vertex adjacent to $v$. A set $S$ is enclaveless if it does not contain any…
This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the…