Related papers: Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticult…
We consider restricted games on weighted graphs associated with minimum partitions. We replace in the classical definition of Myerson restricted game the connected components of any subgraph by the subcomponents corresponding to a minimum…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
Explainability is crucial for the application of black-box Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) in critical fields such as healthcare, finance, cybersecurity, and more. Various feature attribution methods, especially the perturbation-based methods,…
We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…
We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…
A quantitative assessment of the global importance of an agent in a team is as valuable as gold for strategists, decision-makers, and sports coaches. Yet, retrieving this information is not trivial since in a cooperative task it is hard to…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…
The connected domination game is played just as the domination game, with an additional requirement that at each stage of the game the vertices played induce a connected subgraph. The number of moves in a D-game (an S-game, resp.) on a…
For a graph $G=(V,E)$, a set $S\subseteq V$ is a dominating set if every vertex in $V-S$ has at least a neighbor in $S$. A dominating set $S$ is a global offensive alliance if for each vertex $v$ in $V-S$ at least half the vertices from the…
The coalition structure formation problem represents an active research area in multi-agent systems. A coalition structure is defined as a partition of the agents involved in a system into disjoint coalitions. The problem of finding the…
The graph coloring game is a two-player game in which, given a graph G and a set of k colors, the two players, Alice and Bob, take turns coloring properly an uncolored vertex of G, Alice having the first move. Alice wins the game if and…
Fractional hedonic games are coalition formation games where a player's utility is determined by the average value they assign to the members of their coalition. These games are a variation of graph hedonic games, which are a class of…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the…
Given a graph $G=\big{(}V(G),E(G)\big{)}$, a set $S\subseteq V(G)$ is called a $k$-dominating set if every vertex in $V(G)\setminus S$ has at least $k$ neighbors in $S$. Two disjoint sets $A,B\subset V(G)$ form a $k$-coalition in $G$ if…
Elucidating the mechanisms that lead to cooperation is still one of the main scientific challenges of current times, as many common cooperative scenarios remain elusive and at odds with Darwin's natural selection theory. Here, we study…
The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…
For a graph $G=(V,E)$, a set $D\subset V(G)$ is a strong dominating set of $G$, if for every vertex $x\in V (G)\setminus D$ there is a vertex $y\in D$ with $xy \in E(G)$ and $deg(x)\leq deg(y)$. A strong coalition consists of two disjoint…