Related papers: Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bound…
We consider a single-server cyclic polling system with three queues where the server follows an adaptive rule: if it finds one of queues empty in a given cycle, it decides not to visit that queue in the next cycle. In the case of limited…
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof…
This paper presents the benefits of formal modelling and verification techniques for self-stabilising distributed algorithms. An algorithm is studied, that takes a set of processes connected by a tree topology and converts it to a ring…
Reconfigurable broadcast networks provide a convenient formalism for modelling and reasoning about networks of mobile agents broadcasting messages to other agents following some (evolving) communication topology. The parameterized…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or single-dipped. Our main interest is the existence of…
We consider multi-dimensional payoff functions in partially observable Markov decision processes. We study the structure of the set of expected payoff vectors of all strategies (policies) and study what kind are needed to achieve a given…
We consider the minimum spanning tree problem in a setting where the edge weights are stochastic from unknown distributions, and the only available information is a single sample of each edge's weight distribution. In this setting, we…
We study organizational elections in which each group nominates one candidate and receives as payoff its members expected utility under a probabilistic winning rule. We empirically justify a standard monotonicity assumption by simulating…
We consider the verification of multiple expected reward objectives at once on Markov decision processes (MDPs). This enables a trade-off analysis among multiple objectives by obtaining the Pareto front. We focus on strategies that are easy…
We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
Recently proposed budding tree is a decision tree algorithm in which every node is part internal node and part leaf. This allows representing every decision tree in a continuous parameter space, and therefore a budding tree can be jointly…
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…
We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. A mechanism is \emph{group-strategyproof}, if no group of agents can misreport so that all its…
We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties…
Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…
Strategy Logic with imperfect information (SLiR) is a very expressive logic designed to express complex properties of strategic abilities in distributed systems. Previous work on SLiR focused on finite systems, and showed that the…
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…