Stable Voting
Theoretical Economics
2023-02-14 v9 Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
Abstract
We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate A' who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). We call this principle Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). Stable Voting satisfies this principle while also having a remarkable ability to avoid tied outcomes in elections even with small numbers of voters.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2108.00542,
title = {Stable Voting},
author = {Wesley H. Holliday and Eric Pacuit},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.00542},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
Added proof of Proposition 1. Forthcoming in Constitutional Political Economy