Line-Up Elections: Parallel Voting with Shared Candidate Pool
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-07-10 v1 Theoretical Economics
Abstract
We introduce the model of line-up elections which captures parallel or sequential single-winner elections with a shared candidate pool. The goal of a line-up election is to find a high-quality assignment of a set of candidates to a set of positions such that each position is filled by exactly one candidate and each candidate fills at most one position. A score for each candidate-position pair is given as part of the input, which expresses the qualification of the candidate to fill the position. We propose several voting rules for line-up elections and analyze them from an axiomatic and an empirical perspective using real-world data from the popular video game FIFA.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2007.04960,
title = {Line-Up Elections: Parallel Voting with Shared Candidate Pool},
author = {Niclas Boehmer and Robert Bredereck and Piotr Faliszewski and Andrzej Kaczmarczyk and Rolf Niedermeier},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.04960},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
Accepted to SAGT 2020