Related papers: Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bound…
The ability to automatically generalise (interactive) proofs and use such generalisations to discharge related conjectures is a very hard problem which remains unsolved. Here, we develop a notion of goal types to capture key properties of…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
Bipartite networks provide a major insight into the organisation of many real-world systems. One of the most relevant issues encountered when modelling a bipartite network is that of facing the information shortage concerning intra-layer…
In this paper, the controllability and observability of linear multi-agent systems over matrix-weighted signed networks are analyzed. Firstly, the definition of equitable partition of matrix-weighted signed multi-agent system is given, and…
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity…
Diversification is usually viewed as a reliable way to reduce risk, yet it can dramatically fail for heavy-tailed losses with infinite mean: pooling independent losses of this type may increase tail risk at every threshold. We study this…
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…
Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…
Several logics for expressing coalitional ability under resource bounds have been proposed and studied in the literature. Previous work has shown that if only consumption of resources is considered or the total amount of resources produced…
We study the problem of designing multiwinner voting rules that are candidate monotone and proportional. We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of proportionality for solid coalitions is candidate monotone.…
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have introduced partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness, to study the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. In this paper, we present results…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past fifty years numerous approaches…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…
Highly dynamic networks are characterized by frequent changes in the availability of communication links. These networks are often partitioned into several components, which split and merge unpredictably. We present a distributed algorithm…
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a…