Related papers: Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bound…

We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…

We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…

Decision trees are widely used due to their interpretability and efficiency, but they struggle in regression tasks that require reliable extrapolation and well-calibrated uncertainty. Piecewise-constant leaf predictions are bounded by the…

In the object reallocation problem, achieving Pareto-efficiency is desirable, but may be too demanding for implementation purposes. In contrast, pair-efficiency, which is the minimal efficiency requirement, is more suitable. Despite being a…

This paper studies a constrained optimization problem over networked systems with an undirected and connected communication topology. The algorithm proposed in this work utilizes singular perturbation, dynamic average consensus, and saddle…

We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…

We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…

Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e., the possible…

We consider a distributed detection system with communication constraints, where several nodes are arranged in an arbitrary tree topology, under the assumption of conditionally independent observations. We propose a cyclic design procedure…

We consider distributed model-checking of Monadic Second-Order logic (MSO) on graphs which constitute the topology of communication networks. The graph is thus both the structure being checked and the system on which the distributed…

We study heterogeneous $k$-facility location games. In this model there are $k$ facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design…

Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…

We consider the problem of PAC-learning decision trees, i.e., learning a decision tree over the n-dimensional hypercube from independent random labeled examples. Despite significant effort, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for learning…

Bayesian persuasion is a model for understanding strategic information revelation: an agent with an informational advantage, called a sender, strategically discloses information by sending signals to another agent, called a receiver. In…

Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals from those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection,…

We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals, and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social…

We investigate the parameterized complexity of strategic behaviors in generalized scoring rules. In particular, we prove that the manipulation, control (all the 22 standard types), and bribery problems are fixed-parameter tractable for most…

A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…

In this paper we investigate measures over bounded lattices, extending and giving a unifying treatment to previous works. In particular, we prove that the measures of an arbitrary bounded lattice can be represented as measures over a…

For the basic maximum likelihood estimating function of the two parameters Weibull distribution, a simple proof on its global monotonicity is given to ensure the existence and uniqueness of its solution. The boundary of the function's…