Related papers: Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bound…
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
Leader election is a basic symmetry breaking problem in distributed computing. All nodes of a network have to agree on a single node, called the leader. If the nodes of the network have distinct labels, then agreeing on a single node means…
We consider the distributed single-winner metric voting problem on a line, where agents and alternative are represented by points on the line of real numbers, the agents are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a…
We introduce a fundamental lemma called the Poisson matching lemma, and apply it to prove one-shot achievability results for various settings, namely channels with state information at the encoder, lossy source coding with side information…
A tree automatic structure is a structure whose domain can be encoded by a regular tree language such that each relation is recognisable by a finite automaton processing tuples of trees synchronously. Words can be regarded as specific…
In rank aggregation, the goal is to combine multiple input rankings into a single output ranking. In this paper, we analyze rank aggregation methods, so-called social welfare functions (SWFs), with respect to strategyproofness, which…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
We consider a distributed setup for reinforcement learning, where each agent has a copy of the same Markov Decision Process but transitions are sampled from the corresponding Markov chain independently by each agent. We show that in this…
We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis…
We continue the study of Bochet et al. and Moulin and Sethuraman on fair allocation in bipartite networks. In these models, there is a moneyless market, in which a non-storable, homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with…
Recent results of Ye and Hansen, Miltersen and Zwick show that policy iteration for one or two player (perfect information) zero-sum stochastic games, restricted to instances with a fixed discount rate, is strongly polynomial. We show that…
Suppose that the outcomes of a roulette table are not entirely random, in the sense that there exists a successful betting strategy. Is there a successful `separable' strategy, in the sense that it does not use the winnings from betting on…
Deciding whether a political districting plan was distorted by a hidden agenda, or whether it dilutes the voting power of some group, requires a neutral baseline for comparison. Remarkably, all nine U.S. Supreme Court justices have now…
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
Distributed resource allocation is a central task in network systems such as smart grids, water distribution networks, and urban transportation systems. When solving such problems in practice it is often important to have nonasymptotic…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
Declarative Distributed Systems (DDSs) are distributed systems grounded in logic programming. Although DDS model-checking is undecidable in general, we detect decidable cases by tweaking the data-source bounds, the message expressiveness,…