相关论文: Equilibria of Replicator Dynamics in Quantum Games

The problem of multi-agent learning and adaptation has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years. It has been suggested that the dynamics of multi agent learning can be studied using replicator equations from population biology.…

Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…

We investigate quantum strategy in moving frames by considering Prisoner's Dilemma and propose four thresholds of $\gamma$ for two players to determine their \textit{Nash Equilibria}. Specially, an interesting phenomenon appears in…

In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are…

In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…

Evolutionary game theory is used to model the evolution of competing strategies in a population of players. Evolutionary stability of a strategy is a dynamic equilibrium, in which any competing mutated strategy would be wiped out from a…

Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…

We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…

A new approach to play games quantum mechanically is proposed. We consider two players who perform measurements in an EPR-type setting. The payoff relations are defined as functions of *correlations*, i.e. without reference to classical or…

Replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of Multiplicative Weights Updates, is the main dynamic in evolutionary game theory. In simple evolutionary zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-Scissors, replicator dynamic is periodic…

We study the advantages of quantum strategies in evolutionary social dilemmas on evolving random networks. We focus our study on the two-player games: prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games. The obtained result show the benefits…

Evolutionary game theory studies populations that change in response to an underlying game. Often, the functional form relating outcome to player attributes or strategy is complex, preventing mathematical progress. In this work, we…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

The introduction of concepts of Game Theory and Ordinary Differential Equations into Biology gave birth to the field of Evolutionary Stable Strategies, with applications in Biology, Genetics, Politics, Economics and others. In special, the…

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…

While the computational complexity of many game-theoretic solution concepts, notably Nash equilibrium, has now been settled, the question of determining the exact complexity of computing an evolutionarily stable strategy has resisted…

We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

The paper contains the attempt to integration of the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state based approach of Houston and Mcnamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies,…

Autonomous LLM-based agents are increasingly engaging in decentralized service interactions to collaboratively execute complex tasks. However, the intrinsic instability and low-cost generativity of LLMs introduce a systemic vulnerability,…