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相关论文: Statistical properties of online auctions

200 篇论文

User feedback is one of the most effective methods to build and maintain trust in electronic commerce platforms. Unfortunately, dishonest sellers often bend over backward to manipulate users' feedback or place phony bids in order to…

社会与信息网络 · 计算机科学 2022-04-22 Michael Fire , Rami Puzis , Dima Kagan , Yuval Elovici

Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2023-03-02 Alex Stein , Avi Schwarzschild , Michael Curry , Tom Goldstein , John Dickerson

We characterize single-item auction formats that are shill-proof in the sense that a profit-maximizing seller has no incentive to submit shill bids. We distinguish between strong shill-proofness, in which a seller with full knowledge of…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2026-01-01 Andrew Komo , Scott Duke Kominers , Tim Roughgarden

This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit from pretending to be one or more bidders via fake identities. It is…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2025-11-04 Haoyuan Zeng

We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…

量子物理 · 物理学 2009-03-31 Kay-Yut Chen , Tad Hogg

Bidding is a key element of search advertising, but the variation in bidders' valuations and strategies is often overlooked. Disclosing bid information helps uncover this heterogeneity and enables platforms to tailor their disclosure…

综合经济学 · 经济学 2024-10-10 Zhu Mingxi , Song Michelle

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

人工智能 · 计算机科学 2009-04-14 Jinzhong Niu , Simon Parsons

Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction. However, this theory does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2014-07-11 Avrim Blum , Yishay Mansour , Jamie Morgenstern

Online auctions play a central role in online advertising, and are one of the main reasons for the industry's scalability and growth. With great changes in how auctions are being organized, such as changing the second- to first-price…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-09-04 Djordje Gligorijevic , Tian Zhou , Bharatbhushan Shetty , Brendan Kitts , Shengjun Pan , Junwei Pan , Aaron Flores

In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2022-03-30 Bernhard Kasberger

Given the magnitude of online auction transactions, it is difficult to safeguard consumers from dishonest sellers, such as shill bidders. To date, the application of Machine Learning Techniques (MLTs) to auction fraud has been limited,…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2019-08-26 Sulaf Elshaar , Samira Sadaoui

Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2012-07-09 Jonathan Bredin , David C. Parkes

All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2017-02-15 Yoad Lewenberg , Omer Lev , Yoram Bachrach , Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-11-28 Qian Wang , Xuanzhi Xia , Zongjun Yang , Xiaotie Deng , Yuqing Kong , Zhilin Zhang , Liang Wang , Chuan Yu , Jian Xu , Bo Zheng

Creating a loyal customer base is one of the most important, and at the same time, most difficult tasks a company faces. Creating loyalty online (e-loyalty) is especially difficult since customers can ``switch'' to a competitor with the…

应用统计 · 统计学 2010-10-11 Wolfgang Jank , Inbal Yahav

Innovative auction methods can be exploited to increase profits, with Shubik's famous "dollar auction" perhaps being the most widely known example. Recently, some mainstream e-commerce web sites have apparently achieved the same end on a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2015-03-13 John W. Byers , Michael Mitzenmacher , Georgios Zervas

We consider a repeated auction where the buyer's utility for an item depends on the time that elapsed since his last purchase. We present an algorithm to build the optimal bidding policy, and then, because optimal might be impractical, we…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2023-08-04 Benjamin Heymann , Alexandre Gilotte , Rémi Chan-Renous

The arrival process of bidders and bids in online auctions is important for studying and modeling supply and demand in the online marketplace. A popular assumption in the online auction literature is that a Poisson bidder arrival process is…

应用统计 · 统计学 2007-12-18 Galit Shmueli , Ralph P. Russo , Wolfgang Jank

While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2022-08-17 Itzhak Rasooly , Carlos Gavidia-Calderon

We study probabilistic single-item second-price auctions where the item is characterized by a set of attributes. The auctioneer knows the actual instantiation of all the attributes, but he may choose to reveal only a subset of these…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2013-02-22 Mingyu Guo , Argyrios Deligkas