相关论文: Agents Play Mix-game

In this paper we consider a network of boolean agents that compete for a limited resource. The agents play the so called Generalized Minority Game where the capacity level is allowed to vary externally. We study the properties of such a…

Coordination and cooperation between humans and autonomous agents in cooperative games raises interesting questions of human decision making and behaviour changes. Here we report our findings from a group formation game in a small-world…

Using the Minority Game model we study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism. We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The central issue here is the information flow :…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game…

We use the Minority Game as a testing frame for the problem of the emergence of diversity in socio-economic systems. For the MG with heterogeneous impacts, we show that the direct generalization of the usual agents' profit does not fit some…

We consider a version of large population games whose players compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime where the system can be…

We continue our study of evolution in minority games by examining games in which agents with poorly performing strategies can trade in their strategies for new ones from a different strategy space. In the context of the games discussed in…

We present a theory which describes a recently introduced model of an evolving, adaptive system in which agents compete to be in the minority. The agents themselves are able to evolve their strategies over time in an attempt to improve…

We present a dynamical theory of a multi-agent market game, the so-called Minority Game (MG), based on crowds and anticrowds. The time-averaged version of the dynamical equations provides a quantitatively accurate, yet intuitively simple,…

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the…

Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…

We show that a simple evolutionary scheme, when applied to the minority game (MG), changes the phase structure of the game. In this scheme each agent evolves individually whenever his wealth reaches the specified bankruptcy level, in…

A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…

We develop a game theoretical model of $N$ heterogeneous interacting agents called the intelligent minority game. The ``intelligent'' agents play the basic minority game and depending on their performances, generate new strategies using the…

This paper reports the effort of deducing the initial strategy distributions of agents in mix-game model which is used to predict a real financial time series generated from a target financial market. Using mix-game to predict Shanghai…

Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or…

We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed majority-minority game, modeling a population in which two types of heterogeneous adaptive agents, namely ``fundamentalists'' driven by differentiation and ``trend-followers''…

We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…

We consider a class of games that are generalizations of the minority game, in that the demand and supply of the resource are specified independently. This allows us to study systems in which agents compete for a resource under different…