相关论文: Stable matching in a common generalization of the …
We propose a notion of concavity in two-sided many-to-one matching, which is an analogue to the balancedness condition in cooperative games. A stable matching exists when the market is concave. We provide a class of concave markets. In the…
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the…
Mechanism design without money has a rich history in social choice literature. Due to the strong impossibility theorem by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, exploring domains in which there exist dominant strategy mechanisms is one of the central…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
We present a generalization of the marriage problem underlying Hall's famous Marriage Theorem to what we call the Symmetric Marriage Problem, a problem that can be thought of as a special case of Maximal Weighted Bipartite Matching. We show…
The theory of optimal choice sets offers a well-established solution framework in social choice and game theory. In social choice theory, decision-making is typically modeled as a maximization problem. However, when preferences are cyclic…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
We introduce and study a new model that we call the {\em matching model}. Items arrive one by one in a buffer and depart from it as soon as possible but by pairs. The items of a departing pair are said to be {\em matched}. There is a finite…
The approach for testing equal predictive accuracy for pairs of forecasting models proposed by Giacomini and White (2006) assumes that the parameters of the underlying forecasting models are estimated using a rolling window of fixed width…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
In this paper, to cope with the shortage of sufficient theoretical support resulted from the fast-growing quantitative financial modeling, we investigate two classes of generalized stochastic volatility models, establish their…
Given $n$ men, $n$ women, and $n$ dogs, each man has an incomplete preference list of women, each woman does an incomplete preference list of dogs, and each dog does an incomplete preference list of men. We understand a family as a triple…
This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that allow multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
Two-sided manufacturing-as-a-service (MaaS) marketplaces connect clients requesting manufacturing services to suppliers providing those services. Matching mechanisms i.e. allocation of clients' orders to suppliers is a key design parameter…
Social storage systems are a good alternative to existing data backup systems of local, centralized, and P2P backup. In this paper, we look at two untouched aspects of social storage systems. One aspect involves modelling social storage as…