相关论文: Modeling On-Line Art Auction Dynamics Using Functi…
We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format…
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectrum allocation, and myriad financial markets. Analytic…
This paper develops a strategic model of trade between two regions in which, depending on the relation among output, financial resources and transportation costs, the adjustment of prices towards an equilibrium is studied. We derive…
First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some, like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non-truthfulness may result in instability and inefficiencies.…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions with budget constraints. In each period, the decision maker needs to submit a bid to win the auction and maximize the total collected reward, subject to…
From disparities in the number of exhibiting artists to auction opportunities, there is evidence of women's under-representation in visual art. Here we explore the exhibition history and auction sales of 65,768 contemporary artists in…
A first attempt at obtaining market--directional information from a non--stationary solution of the dynamic equation "future price tends to the value that maximizes the number of shares traded per unit time" [1] is presented. We demonstrate…
Most tourist destinations are facing regular and consistent seasonality with significant economic and social impacts. This phenomenon is more pronounced in the post-covid era, where demand for travel has increased but unevenly among…
We analyze reputation dynamics in an online market for illicit drugs using a novel dataset of prices and ratings. The market is a black market, and so contracts cannot be enforced. We study the role that reputation plays in alleviating…
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…
Contextual pricing strategies are prevalent in online retailing, where the seller adjusts prices based on products' attributes and buyers' characteristics. Although such strategies can enhance seller's profits, they raise concerns about…
We study competitive dynamic pricing among multiple sellers, motivated by the rise of large-scale experimentation and algorithmic pricing in retail and online marketplaces. Sellers repeatedly set prices using simple learning rules and…
In this paper we introduce a multilevel specification with stochastic volatility for repeated cross-sectional data. Modelling the time dynamics in repeated cross sections requires a suitable adaptation of the multilevel framework where the…
Stylized facts can be regarded as constraints for any modeling attempt of price dynamics on a financial market, in that an empirically reasonable model has to reproduce these stylized facts at least qualitatively. The dynamics of market…
This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…
Online auctions play a central role in online advertising, and are one of the main reasons for the industry's scalability and growth. With great changes in how auctions are being organized, such as changing the second- to first-price…
We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate…
We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary transfers among the signatories. We propose a dynamic…
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…
Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from…