相关论文: On eligibility by the de Borda voting rules

This paper studies a dominance relation among scoring rules with respect to avoiding the selection of the Condorcet loser. In a voting model with three or more alternatives, we say that a scoring rule $f$ Condorcet-loser-dominates…

We provide a constructive proof of Border's theorem [Bor91, HR15a] and its generalization to reduced-form auctions with asymmetric bidders [Bor07, MV10, CKM13]. Given a reduced form, we identify a subset of Border constraints that are…

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past fifty years numerous approaches…

We present a novel approach to the core set/instance selection problem in machine learning. Our approach is based on recent results on (proportional) representation in approval-based multi-winner elections. In our model, instances play a…

Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…

We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…

In this paper, we propose a new averaging model for modeling the competitive influence of $K$ candidates among $n$ voters in an election process. For such an influence propagation model, we address the question of how many seeded voters a…

We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of…

In an approval-based committee election, the task is to select a committee of up to $k$ candidates from a set of $m$ candidates based on the preferences of $n$ voters, each of whom approves a subset of the candidates. A central open…

We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…

Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. A length-$m$ (so-called) scoring vector applies only to $m$-candidate elections. To handle general elections, one must use a family of vectors, one per length. The most…

The margin of victory of an election is a useful measure to capture the robustness of an election outcome. It also plays a crucial role in determining the sample size of various algorithms in post election audit, polling etc. In this work,…

This article aims to present a unified framework for grading-based voting processes. The idea is to represent the grades of each voter on d candidates as a point in R^d and to define the winner of the vote using the deepest point of the…

We consider a reasonably simple voting system which can be implemented for web-based ballots. Simplicity, modularity and the requirement of compatibility with current web browsers leads to a system which satisfies a set of security…

Fairness in multiwinner elections, a growing line of research in computational social choice, primarily concerns the use of constraints to ensure fairness. Recent work proposed a model to find a diverse \emph{and} representative committee…

We prove that the polar decomposition of the singular part of a vector measure depends on its conditional expectations computed with respect to the $q$-regular filtration. This dependency is governed by a martingale analog of the so-called…

We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of $k$…

This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules and provide an axiomatic…

May's classical theorem states that in a single-winner choose-one voting system with just two candidates, majority rule is the only social choice function satisfying anonimity, neutrality and positive responsiveness axiom. Anonimity and…

Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…