相关论文: Optimal stopping in a two-sided secretary problem

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…

The \emph{Temp Secretary Problem} was recently introduced by Fiat et al. It is a generalization of the Secretary Problem, in which commitments are temporary for a fixed duration. We present a simple online algorithm with improved…

We consider a classic rendezvous game where two players try to meet each other on a set of $n$ locations. In each round, every player visits one of the locations and the game finishes when the players meet at the same location. The goal is…

The prophet secretary problem is a combination of the prophet inequality and the secretary problem, where elements are drawn from known independent distributions and arrive in uniformly random order. In this work, we design 1) a…

The stable matching problem is one of the central problems of algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties, the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum cardinality is an NP-hard problem, even when the ties are…

This paper considers a finite horizon optimal stopping problem for a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables, where the objective is to design stopping rules that attempt to select the random variable with the…

In the rendezvous problem, two parties with different labelings of the vertices of a complete graph are trying to meet at some vertex at the same time. It is well-known that if the parties have predetermined roles, then the strategy where…

We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…

In business, politics and life, folk wisdom encourages people to aim for above-average results, but to not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Here, we mathematically formalize and extend this folk wisdom. We model a time-limited…

In the classic prophet inequality, samples from independent random variables arrive online. A gambler that knows the distributions must decide at each point in time whether to stop and pick the current sample or to continue and lose that…

Babaioff et al. [BIK2007] introduced the matroid secretary problem in 2007, a natural extension of the classic single-choice secretary problem to matroids, and conjectured that a constant-competitive online algorithm exists. The conjecture…

An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…

In this paper, we consider the communication complexity of protocols that compute stable matchings. We work within the context of Gale and Shapley's original stable marriage problem\cite{GS62}: $n$ men and $n$ women each privately hold a…

The hiring problem is studied for general strategies based only on the relative ranking of the candidates; this includes some well known strategies studied before such as hiring above the median. We give general limit theorems for the…

We consider directed graphs over a set of n agents, where an edge (i,j) is taken to mean that agent i supports or trusts agent j. Given such a graph and an integer k\leq n, we wish to select a subset of k agents that maximizes the sum of…

This paper is interested in the problem of optimal stopping in a mean field game context. The notion of mixed solution is introduced to solve the system of partial differential equations which models this kind of problem. This notion…

Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…

Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and…

Consider a two-person zero-sum search game between a hider and a searcher. The hider hides among $n$ discrete locations, and the searcher successively visits individual locations until finding the hider. Known to both players, a search at…

This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…