Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem
Abstract
Babaioff et al. [BIK2007] introduced the matroid secretary problem in 2007, a natural extension of the classic single-choice secretary problem to matroids, and conjectured that a constant-competitive online algorithm exists. The conjecture still remains open despite substantial partial progress, including constant-competitive algorithms for numerous special cases of matroids, and an -competitive algorithm in the general case. Many of these algorithms follow principled frameworks. The limits of these frameworks are previously unstudied, and prior work establishes only that a handful of particular algorithms cannot resolve the matroid secretary conjecture. We initiate the study of impossibility results for frameworks to resolve this conjecture. We establish impossibility results for a natural class of greedy algorithms and for randomized partition algorithms, both of which contain known algorithms that resolve special cases.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2111.04114,
title = {Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem},
author = {Maryam Bahrani and Hedyeh Beyhaghi and Sahil Singla and S. Matthew Weinberg},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2111.04114},
year = {2021}
}
Comments
The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2021)