On Variants of the Matroid Secretary Problem
Abstract
We present a number of positive and negative results for variants of the matroid secretary problem. Most notably, we design a constant-factor competitive algorithm for the "random assignment" model where the weights are assigned randomly to the elements of a matroid, and then the elements arrive on-line in an adversarial order (extending a result of Soto \cite{Soto11}). This is under the assumption that the matroid is known in advance. If the matroid is unknown in advance, we present an -approximation, and prove that a better than approximation is impossible. This resolves an open question posed by Babaioff et al. \cite{BIK07}. As a natural special case, we also consider the classical secretary problem where the number of candidates is unknown in advance. If is chosen by an adversary from , we provide a nearly tight answer, by providing an algorithm that chooses the best candidate with probability at least and prove that a probability better than cannot be achieved (where is the -th harmonic number).
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1104.4081,
title = {On Variants of the Matroid Secretary Problem},
author = {Shayan Oveis Gharan and Jan Vondrák},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1104.4081},
year = {2011}
}