相关论文: Conjectures on three-dimensional stable matching

We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…

A broad range of nonlinear processes over networks are governed by threshold dynamics. So far, existing mathematical theory characterizing the behavior of such systems has largely been concerned with the case where the thresholds are…

Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents…

In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of "cycles in…

Search problems at various scales involve a searcher, be it a molecule before reaction or a foraging animal, which performs an intermittent motion. Here we analyze a generic model based on such type of intermittent motion, in which the…

The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) has been extremely discussed in the literature and it is useful to a number of real-world applications. We propose a generalized version of the SMP in which numbers of the matching groups are different as…

Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…

I show stable, localized, single and multi-spot patterns of three classes - stationary, moving, and rotating - that exist within a limited range of parameter values in the two-dimensional Gray-Scott reaction-diffusion model with ${\sigma} =…

This paper concerns the recent Virasoro conjecture for the theory of stable pairs on a 3-fold proposed by Oblomkov, Okounkov, Pandharipande and the author in arXiv:2008.12514. Here we extend the conjecture to 3-folds with…

Previous experiments [M. J. Coleman and A. Ruina, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 3658 (1998)] showed that a gravity-powered toy with no control and which has no statically stable near-standing configurations can walk stably. We show here that a…

Straight lines are common features in human made environments, which makes them a frequently explored feature for control applications. Many control schemes, like Visual Servoing, require the 3D parameters of the features to be estimated.…

We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…

We present a polynomial-time $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching in a many-to-many matching model with ties and laminar constraints on both sides. We formulate our problem…

The single particle stability in a circular accelerator is of concern especially for operational regimes involving beam storage of hours. In the proximity to a resonance this stability domain shrinks, and the phase space fragments into a…

We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…

The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…

Game dynamics theory, as a field of science, the consistency of theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is…

To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…

This paper presents the design of deep learning architectures which allow to classify the social relationship existing between two people who are walking in a side-by-side formation into four possible categories --colleagues, couple, family…

In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…