相关论文: Is Complexity a Source of Incompleteness?

For Hilbert, the consistency of a formal theory T is an infinite series of statements "D is free of contradictions" for each derivation D and a consistency proof is i) an operation that, given D, yields a proof that D is free of…

In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…

We define and investigate HC-forcing invariant formulas of set theory, whose interpretations in the hereditarily countable sets are well behaved under forcing extensions. This leads naturally to a notion of cardinality ||Phi|| for sentences…

Given a sound first-order p-time theory $T$ capable of formalizing syntax of first-order logic we define a p-time function $g_T$ that stretches all inputs by one bit and we use its properties to show that $T$ must be incomplete. We leave it…

Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…

We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…

Our main result (Theorem A) shows the incompleteness of any consistent sequential theory T formulated in a finite language such that T is axiomatized by a collection of sentences of bounded quantifier-alternation-depth. Our proof employs an…

G{\"o}del's completeness theorem for classical first-order logic is one of the most basic theorems of logic. Central to any foundational course in logic, it connects the notion of valid formula to the notion of provable formula.We survey a…

Most work on computational complexity is concerned with time. However this course will try to show that program-size complexity, which measures algorithmic information, is of much greater philosophical significance. I'll discuss how one can…

Although the categorical arithmetic is not effectively axiomatizable, the belief that the incompleteness Theorems can be apply to it is fairly common. Furthermore, the so-called "essential" (or "inherent") semantic incompleteness of the…

If no optimal propositional proof system exists, we (and independently Pudl\'ak) prove that ruling out length $t$ proofs of any unprovable sentence is hard. This mapping from unprovable to hard-to-prove sentences powerfully translates facts…

General relativity, despite its profound successes, fails as a complete theory due to presence of singularities. While it is widely believed that quantum gravity has the potential to be a complete theory, in which spacetime consistently…

We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…

We study the collection of first-order logical schemata all of whose instances are theorems of a given theory $T$; we call these the validities of $T$ ($\mathsf{V}(T)$). It is easy to see that if $T$ is a decidable theory, then…

By Solovay's celebrated completeness result on formal provability we know that the provability logic $\mathrm GL$ describes exactly all provable structural properties for any sound and strong enough arithmetical theory with a decidable…

Transcript of G.J. Chaitin's 2 March 2000 Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science Distinguished Lecture. The notion of randomness is taken from physics and applied to pure mathematics in order to shed light on the…

According to Chaitin, G\"odel once told him "it doesn't matter which paradox you use [to prove the First Incompleteness Theorem]". In this paper I will present a few infinitary paradoxes and show how to "translate" them to some undecidable…

We give a reframing of Godel's first and second incompleteness theorems that applies even to some undefinable theories of arithmetic. The usual Hilbert-Bernays provability conditions and the diagonal lemma are replaced by a more direct…

As it follows from G\"odel's incompleteness theorems, any consistent formal system of axioms and rules of inference should imply a true unprovable statement. Actually, this fundamental principle can be efficiently applicable in…