相关论文: Determinacy Maximum

We use machine learning to provide a tractable measure of the amount of predictable variation in the data that a theory captures, which we call its "completeness." We apply this measure to three problems: assigning certain equivalents to…

We establish a generic result concerning order independence of a dominance relation on finite games. It allows us to draw conclusions about order independence of various dominance relations in a direct and simple way.

We examine the relationship between Dependence Logic and game logics. A variant of Dynamic Game Logic, called Transition Logic, is developed, and we show that its relationship with Dependence Logic is comparable to the one between…

An unconventional approach for optimal stopping under model ambiguity is introduced. Besides ambiguity itself, we take into account how ambiguity-averse an agent is. This inclusion of ambiguity attitude, via an $\alpha$-maxmin nonlinear…

We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

n infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, is determined. The proof relies on a representation of the game as…

We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…

We study learning in complete-information games, allowing the players' models of their environment to be misspecified. We introduce Berk--Nash rationalizability: the largest self-justified set of actions -- meaning each action in the set is…

In this paper we introduce polytopal stochastic games, an extension of two-player, zero-sum, turn-based stochastic games, in which we may have uncertainty over the transition probabilities. In these games the uncertainty over the…

The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way…

We propose a continuous version of the classical Gale--Berlekamp switching game. We also study a weighted version of this new continuous game. The main results of this paper concern growth estimates for the corresponding optimization…

Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions. We show that the canonical utility maximisation is one special case of a quantifier and that our more…

A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be…

We study a class of deterministic mean field games on finite and infinite time horizons arising in models of optimal exploitation of exhaustible resources. The main characteristic of our game is an absorption constraint on the players'…

In this paper we present a novel approach to optimise tactical and strategic decision making in football (soccer). We model the game of football as a multi-stage game which is made up from a Bayesian game to model the pre-match decisions…

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…