相关论文: Truth-telling Reservations

State-of-the-art large language models require specialized hardware and substantial energy to operate. As a consequence, cloud-based services that provide access to large language models have become very popular. In these services, the…

We study the robust sequential screening problem of a monopolist seller of multiple cloud computing services facing a buyer who has private information about his demand distribution for these services. At the time of contracting, the buyer…

Many advertisers buy advertisements (ads) on the Internet or on traditional media and seek simple, online mechanisms to reserve ad slots in advance. Media publishers represent a vast and varying inventory, and they too seek automatic,…

This paper studies a mechanism design problem over a network, where agents can only participate by referrals. The Bulow-Klemberer theorem proposes that expanding the number of participants is a more effective approach to increase revenue…

This survey reviews recent developments in revealed preference theory. It discusses the testable implications of theories of choice that are germane to specific economic environments. The focus is on expected utility in risky environments;…

The ability to uncover preferences from choices is fundamental for both positive economics and welfare analysis. Overwhelming evidence shows that choice is stochastic, which has given rise to random utility models as the dominant paradigm…

Securing necessary resources for edge computing processes via effective resource trading becomes a critical technique in supporting computation-intensive mobile applications. Conventional onsite spot trading could facilitate this paradigm…

We consider an auction of identical digital goods to customers whose valuations are drawn independently from known distributions. Myerson's classic result identifies the truthful mechanism that maximizes the seller's expected profit. Under…

The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to trade consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and in return provide them incentives (monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the…

In multi-hop secondary networks, bidding strategies for spectrum auction, route selection and relaying incentives should be jointly considered to establish multi-hop communication. In this paper, a framework for joint resource bidding and…

Polling systems with losses are useful mathematical objects that can model many practical systems like travelling salesman problem with recurrent requests. One of the less studied yet an important aspect in such systems is the disparity in…

It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…

One of the fundamental problems in crowdsourcing is the trade-off between the number of the workers needed for high-accuracy aggregation and the budget to pay. For saving budget, it is important to ensure high quality of the crowd-sourced…

We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…

Eliciting reliable human feedback is essential for many machine learning tasks, such as learning from noisy labels and aligning AI systems with human preferences. Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize truthful reporting without ground…

We apply a utility-based method to obtain the value of a finite-time investment opportunity when the underlying real asset is not perfectly correlated to a traded financial asset. Using a discrete-time algorithm to calculate the…

We propose a simple mechanism to facilitate the buying and selling of useful, bluntly honest information. The for-profit, arm's length knowledge exchange this mechanism enables may dramatically increase the pace of scientific progress.

Many online companies sell advertisement space in second-price auctions with reserve. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic method to learn a profitable strategy to set the reserve price. We use historical auction data with features to…

We present algorithms for implementing local spectrum redistribution in wireless networks using a mechanism design approach. For example, in single-hop request scheduling, secondary users are modeled as rational agents that have private…

We study a fundamental model of resource allocation in which a finite number of resources must be assigned in an online manner to a heterogeneous stream of customers. The customers arrive randomly over time according to known stochastic…