捆绑客户：如何利用客户间的信任最大化卖家利润
计算机科学与博弈论
2012-04-05 v2
摘要
我们考虑向客户拍卖相同数字商品的情景，客户的估值是从已知分布中独立抽取的。Myerson 的经典结果确定了最大化卖家期望利润的真实机制。在假设小群体中的客户能够了解彼此估值的情况下，我们展示了如何通过一种提供客户群体购买物品捆绑包的机制来改进 Myerson 的结果，从而为卖家带来更高的收益。
引用
@article{arxiv.1202.0969,
title = {Bundling Customers: How to Exploit Trust Among Customers to Maximize Seller Profit},
author = {Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1202.0969},
year = {2012}
}
备注
11 pages, 1 figure. After posting the first version of this paper we learned that much of its mathematical content already appears in the literature, for example in "Multiproduct nonlinear pricing" by Armstrong (1996), although in a slightly different context of bundling products, rather than customers