相关论文: Symbolic Dynamics for Discrete Adaptive Games

We provide results of a deterministic approximation for non-Markovian stochastic processes modeling finite populations of individuals who recurrently play symmetric finite games and imitate each other according to payoffs. We show that a…

We analyze, both analytically and numerically, the self-organization of a system of "selfish" adaptive agents playing an arbitrary iterated pairwise game (defined by a 2X2 payoff matrix). Examples of possible games to play are: the…

Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally tested various learning algorithms, but a comparative analysis…

We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…

Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for analyzing the dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions. Potential games are one such special but restrictive class of games that allow for tractable…

In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority…

We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…

We study the dynamics and statics of a dilute batch minority game with random external information. We focus on the case in which the number of connections per agent is infinite in the thermodynamic limit. The dynamical scenario of…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

Multi-agent learning is intrinsically harder, more unstable and unpredictable than single agent optimization. For this reason, numerous specialized heuristics and techniques have been designed towards the goal of achieving convergence to…

New continuous and stochastic extensions of the minority game, devised as a fundamental model for a market of competitive agents, are introduced and studied in the context of statistical physics. The new formulation reproduces the key…

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…

The El Farol Bar Problem is a classic computational economics problem in which agents attempt to attend a weekly event at a bar only if it is not too crowded. Each agent has access to multiple competing strategies that may be used to…

A systematic framework for analyzing dynamical attributes of games has not been well-studied except for the special class of potential or near-potential games. In particular, the existing results have shortcomings in determining the…

From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game that has not received much attention (specially the variety known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is already solved, given general results in game theory. However, the…

The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

Evolutionary game theory has traditionally employed deterministic models to describe population dynamics. These models, due to their inherent nonlinearities, can exhibit deterministic chaos, where population fluctuations follow complex,…