相关论文: A Trilemma in AMM Mechanism Design

Smart Contracts and transactions allow users to implement elaborate constructions on cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Many of these constructions, including operational payment channels and atomic swaps, use a building…

Multiple access mobile edge computing has been proposed as a promising technology to bring computation services close to end users, by making good use of edge cloud servers. In mobile device clouds (MDC), idle end devices may act as edge…

We present the notion of multilevel slashing, where proof-of-stake blockchain validators can obtain gradual levels of assurance that a certain block is bound to be finalized in a global consensus procedure, unless an increasing and…

The system operator's scheduling problem in electricity markets, called unit commitment, is a non-convex mixed-integer program. The optimal value function is non-convex, preventing the application of traditional marginal pricing theory to…

Multi-access edge computing (MEC) is one of the enabling technologies for high-performance computing at the edge of the 6 G networks, supporting high data rates and ultra-low service latency. Although MEC is a remedy to meet the growing…

The set of distributed ledger architectures known as blockchain is best known for cryptocurrency applications such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. These permissionless block chains are showing the potential to be disruptive to the financial…

Incentivizing flexible consumption of end-users is key to maximizing the value of local exchanges within Renewable Energy Communities. If centralized coordination for flexible resources planning raises concerns regarding data privacy and…

Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory. \cite{chung2023foundations} introduce the notion of a…

Executing smart contracts is a compute and storage-intensive task, which currently dominates modern blockchain's performance. Given that computers are becoming increasingly multicore, concurrency is an attractive approach to improve…

Prediction markets are powerful mechanisms for information aggregation, but existing designs are optimized for single-event contracts. In practice, traders frequently express beliefs about joint outcomes - through parlays in sports,…

We study the following problem that is motivated by Blockchains where ``miners'' are serially given the monopoly for assembling transactions into the next block. Our model has a single good that is sold repeatedly every day where new demand…

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…

Validators in permissionless, large-scale blockchains, such as Ethereum, are typically payoff-maximizing, rational actors. Ethereum relies on in-protocol incentives, like rewards for correct and timely votes, to induce honest behavior and…

The successive generations of consensus algorithms have progressively shifted the performance bottleneck of blockchains to the execution layer. While recent works address this by parallelizing transaction execution, they often overlook the…

In a decentralized environment, exchanging resources requires users to bargain until an agreement is found. Moreover, human agreements involve a combination of collaborative and selfish behavior and often induce circularity, complicating…

To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden [44] asks whether there is a TFM that is incentive compatible for both the users and the miner, and is…

Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…

AMMs are autonomous smart contracts deployed on a blockchain that make markets between different assets that live on that chain. In this paper we are examining a specific class of AMMs called Constant Function Market Makers whose trading…

The convergence of mobile edge computing (MEC) and blockchain is transforming the current computing services in wireless Internet-of-Things networks, by enabling task offloading with security enhancement based on blockchain mining. Yet the…

We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…