相关论文: A Trilemma in AMM Mechanism Design

Nowadays, federated recommendation technology is rapidly evolving to help multiple organisations share data and train models while meeting user privacy, data security and government regulatory requirements. However, federated recommendation…

Designing automated market makers (AMMs) for prediction markets on combinatorial securities over large outcome spaces poses significant computational challenges. Prior research has primarily focused on combinatorial prediction markets…

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) drives the prosperity of the blockchain ecosystem. By strategically including, excluding, or reordering transactions within blocks, block producers can extract additional value, which in turn incentivizes…

Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to their centralized counterparts. Recently, off-chain…

The performance of existing permissionless smart contract platforms such as Ethereum is limited by the consensus layer. Prism is a new proof-of-work consensus protocol that provably achieves throughput and latency up to physical limits…

In this paper, we introduce a novel framework to model the exchange rate dynamics between two intrinsically linked cryptoassets, such as stablecoins pegged to the same fiat currency or a liquid staking token and its associated native token.…

While high-stakes ML applications demand strict regulations, strategic ML providers often evade them to lower development costs. To address this challenge, we cast AI regulation as a mechanism design problem under uncertainty and introduce…

This paper introduces Capability-Priced Micro-Markets (CPMM), a micro-economic framework designed to enable robust, scalable, and secure commerce among autonomous AI agents on the agentic web. The framework addresses the fundamental…

Financial fraud cases are on the rise even with the current technological advancements. Due to the lack of inter-organization synergy and because of privacy concerns, authentic financial transaction data is rarely available. On the other…

Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…

Blockchains are maintained by a network of participants that run algorithms designed to maintain collectively a distributed machine tolerant to Byzantine attacks. From the point of view of users, blockchains provide the illusion of…

We identify a subtle security issue that impacts the design of smart contracts, because agents may themselves deploy smart contracts (side contracts). Typically, equilibria of games are analyzed in vitro, under the assumption that players…

Mobile edge computing (MEC) and next-generation mobile networks are set to disrupt the way intelligent and autonomous systems are interconnected. This will have an effect on a wide range of domains, from the Internet of Things to autonomous…

Machine learning has recently enabled large advances in artificial intelligence, but these results can be highly centralized. The large datasets required are generally proprietary; predictions are often sold on a per-query basis; and…

Price benchmarks are used to incorporate market price trends into contracts, but their use can create opportunities for manipulation by parties involved in the contract. This paper examines this issue using a realistic and tractable model…

In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the…

Token economics has emerged as a useful lens for understanding resource allocation, value creation, and pricing in large language model systems. While recent work has increasingly treated tokens as economic primitives, there remains a…

Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees…

The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge…

We study optimal auction design for Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) auction markets on Ethereum. Using a dataset of 2.2 million transactions across three major orderflow providers, we establish three empirical regularities: extracted values…