相关论文: Private Languages

An agent may strategically employ a vague message to mislead an audience's belief about the state of the world, but this may cause the agent to feel guilt or negatively impact how the audience perceives the agent. Using a novel experimental…

Emergent communication offers insight into how agents develop shared structured representations, yet most research assumes homogeneous modalities or aligned representational spaces, overlooking the perceptual heterogeneity of real-world…

Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect…

We study rationally inattentive echo chambers, where players allocate limited attention to biased primary sources and to other players as secondary sources to acquire information about an uncertain state. The resulting Poisson attention…

This paper analyzes a cheap-talk model with multiple senders and one receiver. Each sender observes a noisy signal about an unknown state and sends a message; the receiver observes the message tally and chooses a policy. This setting shares…

We simulate behaviour of two independent reinforcement learning algorithms playing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission. We adopt memoryless algorithms to capture learning in a static game where a large…

A game is introduced to study the effect of privacy in strategic communication between well-informed senders and a receiver. The receiver wants to accurately estimate a random variable. The sender, however, wants to communicate a message…

We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are strategic substitutes under a disclosure cost but complements…

This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…

This paper analyzes the fundamental limits of strate- gic communication in network settings. Strategic communication differs from the conventional communication paradigms in in- formation theory since it involves different objectives for…

We propose a light-weight client-server model of communication between existing implementations of different program analyses. The communication is on-line and anonymous which means that all analyses simultaneously analyse the same program…

Recent debates over adults' theory of mind use have been fueled by surprising failures of perspective-taking in communication, suggesting that perspective-taking can be relatively effortful. How, then, should speakers and listeners allocate…

A principal and $n\ge 2$ agents can launch a project if the principal proposes it and at least $k$ agents accept. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an ex ante unknown state. The principal can conduct a test to learn about…

We study linguistic indirectness when speakers attend to social ties. Social ties are modeled by a graph, and conferences are the sets of nodes that hear a message. Conference worth is a distance polynomial on the graph; allocations are…

Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…

We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the…

This paper investigates the message complexity of distributed information spreading (a.k.a gossip or token dissemination) in adversarial dynamic networks, where the goal is to spread $k$ tokens of information to every node on an $n$-node…

Although companies are exhorted to provide more information to the financial community, it is evident that they choose different paths based upon their strategic emphasis and competitive environments. Our investigation explores the…

Sender-receiver games are simple models of information transmission that provide a formalism to study the evolution of honest signaling and deception between a sender and a receiver. In many practical scenarios, lies often affect groups of…

Multi-strategy hedge funds face a fundamental organizational choice: should analysts generating trading strategies communicate, and if so, how? We investigate this using 5-agent LLM-based trading systems across 450 experiments spanning 21…