相关论文: Multi-Winner Voting Games in TU and NTU: When is t…

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…

Motivated by the real-world problem of international kidney exchange (IKEP), recent literature introduced a generalized transferable utility matching game featuring a partition of the vertex set of a graph into players, and analyzed its…

In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity…

We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…

Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness,…

In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…

Fairness in multiwinner elections, a growing line of research in computational social choice, primarily concerns the use of constraints to ensure fairness. Recent work proposed a model to find a diverse \emph{and} representative committee…

This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a group of agents, while maintaining stability in the sense of the core constraints of a cooperative transferable utility game, or TU game.…

We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…

We consider the multiwinner election problem where the goal is to choose a committee of $k$ candidates given the voters' utility functions. We allow arbitrary additional constraints on the chosen committee, and the utilities of voters to…

We present a novel approach to the core set/instance selection problem in machine learning. Our approach is based on recent results on (proportional) representation in approval-based multi-winner elections. In our model, instances play a…

A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand…

Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…

In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by…

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic,…

The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…

We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…

In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…