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相关论文: RowHammer Vulnerability Counter (RVC): Redefining …

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This paper investigates secure low-cost in-DRAM trackers for mitigating Rowhammer (RH). In-DRAM solutions have the advantage that they can solve the RH problem within the DRAM chip, without relying on other parts of the system. However,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-07-24 Moinuddin Qureshi , Salman Qazi , Aamer Jaleel

Rowhammer is a serious security problem of contemporary dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) where reads or writes of bits can flip other bits. DRAM manufacturers add mitigations, but don't disclose details, making it difficult for customers…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-12-01 Amir Naseredini , Martin Berger , Matteo Sammartino , Shale Xiong

DRAM chips are vulnerable to read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or keeping open a DRAM row causes bitflips in nearby rows. Attackers leverage RowHammer bitflips in real systems to take over…

Modern systems mitigate Rowhammer using victim refresh, which refreshes the two neighbours of an aggressor row when it encounters a specified number of activations. Unfortunately, complex attack patterns like Half-Double break…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-08-30 Anish Saxena , Saurav Mathur , Moinuddin Qureshi

Since its public introduction in the mid-2010s, the Row Hammer (RH) phenomenon has drawn significant attention from the research community due to its security implications. Although many RH-protection schemes have been proposed by processor…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2021-12-28 Michael Jaemin Kim , Jaehyun Park , Yeonhong Park , Wanju Doh , Namhoon Kim , Tae Jun Ham , Jae W. Lee , Jung Ho Ahn

As memory scales down to smaller technology nodes, new failure mechanisms emerge that threaten its correct operation. If such failure mechanisms are not anticipated and corrected, they can not only degrade system reliability and…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2017-03-03 Onur Mutlu

With lowering thresholds, transparently defending against Rowhammer within DRAM is challenging due to the lack of time to perform mitigation. Commercially deployed in-DRAM defenses like TRR that steal time from normal refreshes~(REF) to…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-01-14 Hritvik Taneja , Moinuddin Qureshi

RowHammer (RH) is a significant and worsening security, safety, and reliability issue of modern DRAM chips that can be exploited to break memory isolation. Therefore, it is important to understand real DRAM chips' RH characteristics.…

Vision Transformers (ViTs) have emerged as powerful architectures in medical image analysis, excelling in tasks such as disease detection, segmentation, and classification. However, their reliance on large, attention-driven models makes…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-10-30 Banafsheh Saber Latibari , Najmeh Nazari , Hossein Sayadi , Houman Homayoun , Abhijit Mahalanobis

Rowhammer attacks have emerged as a significant threat to modern DRAM-based memory systems, leveraging frequent memory accesses to induce bit flips in adjacent memory cells. This work-in-progress paper presents an adaptive, many-sided…

硬件体系结构 · 计算机科学 2025-09-25 Antoine Plin , Frédéric Fauberteau , Nga Nguyen

The RowHammer vulnerability in DRAM is a critical threat to system security. To protect against RowHammer, vendors commit to security-through-obscurity: modern DRAM chips rely on undocumented, proprietary, on-die mitigations, commonly known…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-10-25 Hasan Hassan , Yahya Can Tugrul , Jeremie S. Kim , Victor van der Veen , Kaveh Razavi , Onur Mutlu

We introduce ABACuS, a new low-cost hardware-counter-based RowHammer mitigation technique that performance-, energy-, and area-efficiently scales with worsening RowHammer vulnerability. We observe that both benign workloads and RowHammer…

In the past decade, many vulnerabilities were discovered in microarchitectures which yielded attack vectors and motivated the study of countermeasures. Further, architectural and physical imperfections in DRAMs led to the discovery of…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-04-15 Andrew J. Adiletta , M. Caner Tol , Yarkın Doröz , Berk Sunar

Rowhammer is a well-studied DRAM phenomenon wherein multiple activations to a given row can cause bit flips in adjacent rows. Many mitigation techniques have been introduced to address Rowhammer, with some support being incorporated into…

硬件体系结构 · 计算机科学 2026-02-17 Maccoy Merrell , Daniel Puckett , Gino Chacon , Jeffrey Stuecheli , Stavros Kalafatis , Paul V. Gratz

The Rowhammer bug allows unauthorized modification of bits in DRAM cells from unprivileged software, enabling powerful privilege-escalation attacks. Sophisticated Rowhammer countermeasures have been presented, aiming at mitigating the…

After a plethora of high-profile RowHammer attacks, CPU and DRAM vendors scrambled to deliver what was meant to be the definitive hardware solution against the RowHammer problem: Target Row Refresh (TRR). A common belief among practitioners…

JEDEC has introduced the Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC) framework for DDR5 and future DRAMs to enable precise counting of DRAM row activations. PRAC enables a holistic mitigation of Rowhammer attacks even at ultra-low Rowhammer…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-05-16 Jeonghyun Woo , Chris S. Lin , Prashant J. Nair , Aamer Jaleel , Gururaj Saileshwar

This paper focuses on mitigating DRAM Rowhammer attacks. In recent years, solutions like TRR have been deployed in DDR4 DRAM to track aggressor rows and then issue a mitigative action by refreshing neighboring victim rows. Unfortunately,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-04-26 Aamer Jaleel , Stephen W. Keckler , Gururaj Saileshwar

The security vulnerabilities due to Rowhammer have worsened over the last decade, with existing in-DRAM solutions, such as TRR, getting broken with simple patterns. In response, the DDR5 specifications have been extended to support Per-Row…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-07-16 Moinuddin Qureshi , Salman Qazi

DRAM scaling has exacerbated the RowHammer vulnerability. To counter this, JEDEC recently introduced Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC) with the Alert Back-Off protocol as an optional DDR5 feature. While promising, PRAC requires per-row…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-05-19 Jeonghyun Woo , Junsu Kim , Aamer Jaleel , Prashant J. Nair