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We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…

Employing a two-species Cahn-Hilliard model with nonreciprocal interactions we show that the interplay of nonreciprocity and conservation laws results in the robust coexistence of uniform stationary and oscillatory phases as well as of…

We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

We find sufficient conditions for commutative non-autonomous systems on certain metric spaces to be topologically stable. In particular, we prove that (i) Every mean equicontinuous, mean expansive system with strong average shadowing…

We presented a systematic treatment of a Hilbert criterion for stability theory for an action of a real reductive group $G$ on a real submanifold $X$ of a K\"ahler manifold $Z$. More precisely, we suppose the action of a compact connected…

Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…

This paper characterizes differentiable subgame perfect equilibria in a continuous time intertemporal decision optimization problem with non-constant discounting. The equilibrium equation takes two different forms, one of which is…

We address Stackelberg models of combinatorial congestion games (CCGs); we aim to optimize the parameters of CCGs so that the selfish behavior of non-atomic players attains desirable equilibria. This model is essential for designing such…

We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all…

In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…

Many well-studied learning dynamics, such as fictitious play and the replicator, are known to not converge in general $N$-player games. The simplest mode of non-convergence is cyclical or periodic behavior. Such cycles are fundamental…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

The present article considers stability of the solutions to nonlinear and nonautonomous compartmental systems governed by ordinary differential equations (ODEs). In particular, compartmental systems with a right-hand side that can be…

Mean field games allow to describe tractable models of dynamic games with a continuum of players, explicit interaction and heterogeneous states. Thus, these models are of great interest for socio-economic applications. A particular class of…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…

We perform dynamical analysis on a stochastic Rosenzweig-MacArthur model driven by {\alpha}-stable L\'evy motion. We analyze the existence of the equilibrium points, and provide a clear illustration of their stability. It is shown that the…

Oscillatory behavior is ubiquitous in out-of-equilibrium systems showing spatio-temporal pattern formation. Starting from a linear large-scale oscillatory instability -- a conserved-Hopf instability -- that naturally occurs in many active…