相关论文: Payoff Continuity in Games of Incomplete Informati…

Two information structures are said to be close if, with high probability, there is approximate common knowledge that interim beliefs are close under the two information structures. We define an "almost common knowledge topology" reflecting…

We revisit the question of modeling incomplete information among 2 Bayesian players, following an ex-ante approach based on values of zero-sum games. $K$ being the finite set of possible parameters, an information structure is defined as a…

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…

In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, an information structure is said to be better than another one if for any cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is restricted to be…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…

The class of exact transferable utility coalitional games, introduced in 1972 by Schmeidler, has been studied both in the context of game theory and in the context of imprecise probabilities. We characterize the cone of exact games by…

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

We address the problem of solving parity games with imperfect information on finite graphs of bounded structural complexity. It is a major open problem whether parity games with perfect information can be solved in PTIME. Restricting the…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…

This paper studies incomplete-information games in which an information provider, an oracle, publicly discloses information to the players. One oracle is said to dominate another if, in every game, it can replicate the equilibrium outcomes…

The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment of the active player and of the capacity to each node of the…

We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations…

Concurrent multi-player games with $\omega$-regular objectives are a standard model for systems that consist of several interacting components, each with its own objective. The standard solution concept for such games is Nash Equilibrium,…

Estimating discrete games of complete information is often computationally difficult due to partial identification and the absence of closed-form moment characterizations. This paper proposes computationally tractable approaches to…

Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…