相关论文: Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Ration…

The Distributional Alignment Game framework provides a powerful variational perspective on Answer-Level Fine-Tuning (ALFT). However, standard algorithms for these games rely on estimating logarithmic rewards from small batches, introducing…

Calibration is a basic property for prediction systems, and algorithms for achieving it are well-studied in both statistics and machine learning. In many applications, however, the predictions are used to make decisions that select which…

We study the problem of data selling for Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) tasks in Generative AI applications. We model each buyer's valuation of a dataset with a natural coverage-based valuation function that increases with the…

The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work in Economics on inferring…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…

We consider a periodic double auction (PDA) setting where buyers of the auction have multiple (but finite) opportunities to procure multiple but fixed units of a commodity. The goal of each buyer participating in such auctions is to reduce…

This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…

Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, complements are common in the standard motivating applications…

We study the basic allocation problem of assigning resources to players so as to maximize fairness. This is one of the few natural problems that enjoys the intriguing status of having a better estimation algorithm than approximation…

In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…

In this paper, we investigate the computation of second-price pacing equilibria (SPPEs), a foundational model in online advertising auctions. We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing exact SPPEs in instances with a constant…

We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…

We present a combinatorial algorithm for determining the market clearing prices of a general linear Arrow-Debreu market, where every agent can own multiple goods. The existing combinatorial algorithms for linear Arrow-Debreu markets…

We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…

We consider the Arrow--Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents' demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for…

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…

Advertisement auctions play a crucial role in revenue generation for e-commerce companies. To make the bidding procedure scalable to thousands of auctions, the automatic bidding (autobidding) algorithms are actively developed in the…

The introduction of aggregator structures has proven effective in bringing fairness to energy resource allocation by negotiating for more resources and economic surplus on behalf of users. This paper extends the fair energy resource…

After experimentation with other designs, the major search engines converged on the weighted, generalized second-price auction (wGSP) for selling keyword advertisements. Notably, this convergence occurred before position auctions were well…

We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…