相关论文: Rawlsian many-to-one matching with non-linear util…

The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…

The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…

Student placements under diversity constraints are a common practice globally. This paper addresses the selection of students by a single school under a \emph{one-to-one convention}, where students can belong to multiple types but are…

We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a true value $v$, but each college $c$ ranks the student according to…

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…

We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable…

We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situation: consider a system where students shall be assigned to universities. There is a first round where some students apply, and a first (stable) matching $M_1$ has to be…

We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…

In a setting of many-to-one two-sided matching with non-transferable utilities, e.g., college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified with data on one single market. Regardless of whether the…

This study considers a model where schools may have multiple priority orders on students, which may be inconsistent with each other. For example, in school choice systems, since the sibling priority and the walk zone priority coexist, the…

We study the online multi-class selection problem with group fairness guarantees, where limited resources must be allocated to sequentially arriving agents. Our work addresses two key limitations in the existing literature. First, we…

Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…

Consider a binary decision making process where a single machine learning classifier replaces a multitude of humans. We raise questions about the resulting loss of diversity in the decision making process. We study the potential benefits of…

Machine learning models are often used to make predictions about admissions process outcomes, such as for colleges or jobs. However, such decision processes differ substantially from the conventional machine learning paradigm. Because…

Matching problems with group-fairness constraints and diversity constraints have numerous applications such as in allocation problems, committee selection, school choice, etc. Moreover, online matching problems have lots of applications in…

The popular matching problem is of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in the order of preference, possibly with ties. A matching M is popular if…

This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…

We study the problem of selecting the top-k candidates from a pool of applicants, where each candidate is associated with a score indicating his/her aptitude. Depending on the specific scenario, such as job search or college admissions,…

Fair top-$k$ selection, which ensures appropriate proportional representation of members from minority or historically disadvantaged groups among the top-$k$ selected candidates, has drawn significant attention. We study the problem of…

School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…