相关论文: Designing Inferable Signaling Schemes for Bayesian…

Bayesian inference has theoretical attractions as a principled framework for reasoning about beliefs. However, the motivations of Bayesian inference which claim it to be the only 'rational' kind of reasoning do not apply in practice. They…

We consider stochastic optimization under distributional uncertainty, where the unknown distributional parameter is estimated from streaming data that arrive sequentially over time. Moreover, data may depend on the decision of the time when…

We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…

Neural networks trained with standard objectives exhibit behaviors characteristic of probabilistic inference: soft clustering, prototype specialization, and Bayesian uncertainty tracking. These phenomena appear across architectures -- in…

Social learning refers to the process by which networked strategic agents learn an unknown state of the world by observing private state-related signals as well as other agents' actions. In their classic work, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and…

I study dynamic contracting where Sender privately observes a Markovian state and seeks to motivate Receiver, who acts. Sender provides incentives in two ways: payments, which alter payoffs ex-post, and (Bayesian) persuasion, which shapes…

Many multi-agent interaction scenarios can be naturally modeled as noncooperative games, where each agent's decisions depend on others' future actions. However, deploying game-theoretic planners for autonomous decision-making requires a…

Bayesian experimental design (BED) aims at designing an experiment to maximize the information gathering from the collected data. The optimal design is usually achieved by maximizing the mutual information (MI) between the data and the…

Simulation-based inference (SBI) methods tackle complex scientific models with challenging inverse problems. However, SBI models often face a significant hurdle due to their non-differentiable nature, which hampers the use of gradient-based…

We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design…

Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary…

Most human behaviors consist of multiple parts, steps, or subtasks. These structures guide our action planning and execution, but when we observe others, the latent structure of their actions is typically unobservable, and must be inferred…

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a…

The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption…

We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the…

To make decisions we are guided by the evidence we collect, as well as the opinions of friends and neighbors. How do we integrate our private beliefs with information we obtain from our social network? To understand the strategies humans…

The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…

In decentralized decision-making problems, agents choose their actions based on locally available information and knowledge about decision rules or strategies of other agents. We consider a three-node cascade network with an encoder, a…

The empirical risk minimization approach to data-driven decision making requires access to training data drawn under the same conditions as those that will be faced when the decision rule is deployed. However, in a number of settings, we…

We present an optimizer which uses Bayesian optimization to tune the system parameters of distributed stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Given a specific context, our goal is to quickly find efficient configurations which appropriately…