Paying and Persuading
Theoretical Economics
2026-05-22 v5
Abstract
I study dynamic contracting where Sender privately observes a Markovian state and seeks to motivate Receiver, who acts. Sender provides incentives in two ways: payments, which alter payoffs ex-post, and (Bayesian) persuasion, which shapes Receiver interim beliefs about payoffs. For all stage game payoffs, discount rates, and Markov transition rules, transfers are a last resort--there is an optimal contract where payments occur only after Sender commits to reveal the state at every continuation history. In an example, the optimal contract is a loyalty program: Sender chooses the static optimal information structure until a random promotion time, after which Sender reveals the state and pays Receiver.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2503.06007,
title = {Paying and Persuading},
author = {Daniel Luo},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.06007},
year = {2026}
}