A More Informed Sender Benefits the Receiver When the Sender Has Transparent Motives
Theoretical Economics
2023-05-03 v1
Abstract
A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action. Regardless of whether the receiver can mediate--and commit to a garbling of the sender's message--or delegate--commit to a stochastic decision rule as a function of the message--and understanding the statement ``the receiver is better off as a result of an improvement of the sender's information'' to mean that her maximal and minimal equilibrium payoffs (weakly) increase as the sender's signal improves (in a Blackwell sense), we find that if the sender is more informed, the receiver is better off.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2305.01512,
title = {A More Informed Sender Benefits the Receiver When the Sender Has Transparent Motives},
author = {Mark Whitmeyer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.01512},
year = {2023}
}