Perfect Bayesian Persuasion
Theoretical Economics
2024-02-13 v1
Abstract
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value. A sufficient condition in finite models is that every action which is receiver-optimal at some belief is uniquely optimal at some other belief -- a generic property. We similarly show the equilibrium sender payoff is typically unique in ordered models. In an extension, we show uniqueness generates robustness to imperfect sender commitment.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2402.06765,
title = {Perfect Bayesian Persuasion},
author = {Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid and Denis Shishkin},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.06765},
year = {2024}
}