Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
Theoretical Economics
2026-02-19 v4
Abstract
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments that form a splitting of an obedient experiment. Some experiments in the collection must be Pareto-ranked in that both players agree on their payoff ranking. If an optimal Bayesian persuasion experiment can be split in this way, then any not-too-ambiguity-averse sender as well as the receiver benefit. There are no benefits when the receiver has only two actions.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2410.05504,
title = {Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication},
author = {Xiaoyu Cheng and Peter Klibanoff and Sujoy Mukerji and Ludovic Renou},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.05504},
year = {2026}
}