Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity
Theoretical Economics
2025-08-27 v1
Abstract
Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from using ambiguous communication strategies over standard (non-ambiguous) ones. This note extends the analysis to environments with prior ambiguity, i.e., pre-existing ambiguity about the payoff-relevant state, and shows that, in the binary state and binary action case, the same no-gain result continues to hold.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2508.18603,
title = {Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity},
author = {Xiaoyu Cheng},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2508.18603},
year = {2025}
}