A Concavification Approach to Ambiguous Persuasion
Theoretical Economics
2021-10-19 v2
Abstract
This note shows that the value of ambiguous persuasion characterized in Beauchene, Li and Li(2019) can be given by a concavification program as in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). In addition, it implies that an ambiguous persuasion game can be equivalently formalized as a Bayesian persuasion game by distorting the utility functions. This result is obtained under a novel construction of ambiguous persuasion.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2106.11270,
title = {A Concavification Approach to Ambiguous Persuasion},
author = {Xiaoyu Cheng},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.11270},
year = {2021}
}
Comments
11 pages, fixing typos