相关论文: Note on the size of a stable matching

The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…

We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…

This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for an…

We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…

This paper considers two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a…

Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…

A matching in a graph is uniquely restricted if no other matching covers exactly the same set of vertices. We establish tight lower bounds on the maximum size of a uniquely restricted matching in terms of order, size, and maximum degree.

We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…

We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…

We use an entropy based method to study two graph maximization problems. We upper bound the number of matchings of fixed size $\ell$ in a $d$-regular graph on $N$ vertices. For $\frac{2\ell}{N}$ bounded away from 0 and 1, the logarithm of…

We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…

For a many-to-one matching model, we study the matchings obtained through the restabilization of stable matchings that had been disrupted by a change in the population. We include a simple representation of the stable matching obtained in…

We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…

The Stable Marriage Problem is to find a one-to-one matching for two equally sized sets of agents. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized match maker, a very large number of…

We study the problem of capacity modification in the many-to-one stable matching of workers and firms. Our goal is to systematically study how the set of stable matchings changes when some seats are added to or removed from the firms. We…

This paper studies the (group) strategy-proofness aspect of two-sided matching markets under stability. For a one-to-one matching market, we show an equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability. We obtain this…

We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…

This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…

We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties $p$ under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural…

In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…