相关论文: Non-Obvious Manipulability in Additively Separable…

In this paper, we study non-obvious manipulability (NOM), a relaxed form of strategyproofness, in the context of Hedonic Games (HGs) with Friends Appreciation (FA) preferences. In HGs, the aim is to partition agents into coalitions…

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…

We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…

In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…

A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…

In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While appealing, a drawback is RM mechanisms are not…

This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical autonomous decision-making framework to address a task allocation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed…

We study coalition formation in the framework of fractional hedonic games (FHGs). The objective is to maximize social welfare in an online model where agents arrive one by one and must be assigned to coalitions immediately and irrevocably.…

We consider a class of coalition formation games called hedonic games, i.e., games in which the utility of a player is completely determined by the coalition that the player belongs to. We first define the class of subset-additive hedonic…

Fractional hedonic games are coalition formation games where a player's utility is determined by the average value they assign to the members of their coalition. These games are a variation of graph hedonic games, which are a class of…

Hedonic games are fundamental models for investigating the formation of coalitions among a set of strategic agents, where every agent has a certain utility for every possible coalition of agents it can be part of. To avoid the…

We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…

Partitioning a set of $n$ items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing social welfare in additively separable hedonic games.…

One of the main challenges in mechanism design is to carefully engineer incentives ensuring truthfulness while maintaining strong social welfare approximation guarantees. But these objectives are often in conflict, making it impossible to…

Analytically, finding the origins of cooperative behavior in infinite-player games is an exciting topic of current interest. In this paper, we compare three analytical methods, i.e., Nash equilibrium mapping (NEM), Darwinian selection (DS)…

In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…

We present a multi-agent decision-making framework for the emergent coordination of autonomous agents whose intents are initially undecided. Dynamic non-cooperative games have been used to encode multi-agent interaction, but ambiguity…

This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values…

In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…

Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…