相关论文: A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choi…

This study considers a model where schools may have multiple priority orders on students, which may be inconsistent with each other. For example, in school choice systems, since the sibling priority and the walk zone priority coexist, the…

Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…

In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district's objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools.…

This chapter surveys the application of matching theory to school choice, motivated by the shift from neighborhood assignment systems to choice-based models. Since educational choice is not mediated by price, the design of allocation…

We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…

Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…

This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without…

We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are…

We study the role of correlation in matching markets, where multiple decision-makers simultaneously face selection problems from the same pool of candidates. We propose a model in which a candidate's priority scores across different…

In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…

We build on the stability-preserving school choice model introduced and studied recently in [MV18]. We settle several of their open problems and we define and solve a couple of new ones.

School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…

We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based matching from machine-learning with preference-based allocation schemes common in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism could be…

We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted $\mathcal{R}_1$ and $\mathcal{R}_2$. In round $\mathcal{R}_1$, the capacity of each…

This article proposes a characterization of admissions markets that can predict the distribution of students at each school or college under both centralized and decentralized admissions paradigms. The characterization builds on recent…

In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…

Strategic classification studies learning in settings where self-interested users can strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. A key working assumption, however, is that "favorable" always means…

Fair classification has been a topic of intense study in machine learning, and several algorithms have been proposed towards this important task. However, in a recent study, Friedler et al. observed that fair classification algorithms may…

While artificial-intelligence-based methods suffer from lack of transparency, rule-based methods dominate in safety-critical systems. Yet, the latter cannot compete with the first ones in robustness to multiple requirements, for instance,…

Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…