相关论文: Liquidity Competition Between Brokers and an Infor…

We investigate the dynamics of a trust game on a mixed population where individuals with the role of buyers are forced to play against a predetermined number of sellers, whom they choose dynamically. Agents with the role of sellers are also…

A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This…

This paper explores an idea of demand-supply balance for smart grids in which consumers are expected to play a significant role. The main objective is to motivate the consumer, by maximizing their benefit both as a seller and a buyer, to…

A marketplace is defined where the private data of suppliers (e.g., prosumers) are protected, so that neither their identity nor their level of stock is made known to end customers, while they can sell their products at a reduced price. A…

Much of the trading activity in Equity markets is directed to brokerage houses. In exchange they provide so-called "soft dollars," which basically are amounts spent in "research" for identifying profitable trading opportunities. Soft…

We study the optimal order placement strategy with the presence of a liquidity cost. In this problem, a stock trader wishes to clear her large inventory by a predetermined time horizon $T$. A trader uses both limit and market orders, and a…

This paper presents a stochastic model for discrete-time trading in financial markets where trading costs are given by convex cost functions and portfolios are constrained by convex sets. The model does not assume the existence of a cash…

Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…

We study a repeated game between a supplier and a retailer who want to maximize their respective profits without full knowledge of the problem parameters. After characterizing the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the stage game…

We extend the QLBS model by reformulating via considering a large trader whose transactions leave a permanent impact on the evolution of the exchange rate process and therefore affect the price of contingent claims on such processes.…

We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers. Crucially, sellers cannot price-discriminate between buyers. We model the structure of the…

This paper deals with a stochastic order-driven market model with waiting costs, for order books with heterogenous traders. Offer and demand of liquidity drives price formation and traders anticipate future evolutions of the order book. The…

We investigate a market with a normal-speed informed trader (IT) who may employ mixed strategy and multiple anticipatory high-frequency traders (HFTs) who are under different inventory pressures, in a three-period Kyle's model. The pure-…

This paper extends the theoretical framework introduced in Liquidity Pools as Mean Field Games: A New Framework, where the interactions among traders in a constant product market-making protocol were modeled using mean field games (MFG). In…

This paper proposes a market clearing mechanism for energy trading in a local transactive market, where each player can participate in the market as seller or buyer and tries to maximize its welfare individually. Market players send their…

We study optimal trade execution strategies in financial markets with discrete order flow. The agent has a finite liquidation horizon and must minimize price impact given a random number of incoming trade counterparties. Assuming that the…

We study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents. In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when the number of traders with different private information is large enough.…

We study liquidity provision in the presence of exogenous competition. We consider a `reference market maker' who monitors her inventory and the aggregated inventory of the competing market makers. We assume that the competing market makers…

Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…

This paper studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where…