相关论文: Higher-Order Belief in Incomplete Information MAID…

A major challenge in cognitive science and AI has been to understand how autonomous agents might acquire and predict behavioral and mental states of other agents in the course of complex social interactions. How does such an agent model the…

Modern news is often comprehensive, weaving together information from diverse domains, including technology, finance, and agriculture. This very comprehensiveness creates a challenge for interpretation, as audiences typically possess…

The standard theory of model-free reinforcement learning assumes that the environment dynamics are stationary and that agents are decoupled from their environment, such that policies are treated as being separate from the world they…

A graphical multiagent model (GMM) represents a joint distribution over the behavior of a set of agents. One source of knowledge about agents' behavior may come from gametheoretic analysis, as captured by several graphical game…

Deploying AI-powered systems requires trustworthy models supporting effective human interactions, going beyond raw prediction accuracy. Concept bottleneck models promote trustworthiness by conditioning classification tasks on an…

Many multi-agent interaction scenarios can be naturally modeled as noncooperative games, where each agent's decisions depend on others' future actions. However, deploying game-theoretic planners for autonomous decision-making requires a…

There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…

Understanding each other is the key to success in collaboration. For humans, attributing mental states to others, the theory of mind, provides the crucial advantage. We argue for formulating human--AI interaction as a multi-agent problem,…

This article argues that the Situation theory and the Channel theory can be used as a general framework for Imperfect Information Management. Different kinds of imperfections are uncertainty, imprecision, vagueness, incompleteness,…

The paper presents a hierarchical Bayesian model for simultaneous inference of tournament graphs and informant error. From multiple informant reports or measurement instrument outputs, the model estimates the structure of a criterion (i.e.,…

The human-agent team, which is a problem in which humans and autonomous agents collaborate to achieve one task, is typical in human-AI collaboration. For effective collaboration, humans want to have an effective plan, but in realistic…

Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with…

Utilizing an abstract information processing model based on minimal yet realistic assumptions inspired by biological systems, we study how to achieve the early visual system's two ultimate objectives: efficient information transmission and…

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on…

Spatial reasoning in partially observable environments has often been approached through passive predictive models, yet theories of embodied cognition suggest that genuinely useful representations arise only when perception is tightly…

Influence diagrams serve as a powerful tool for modelling symmetric decision problems. When solving an influence diagram we determine a set of strategies for the decisions involved. A strategy for a decision variable is in principle a…

Mean-payoff games (MPGs) are infinite duration two-player zero-sum games played on weighted graphs. Under the hypothesis of perfect information, they admit memoryless optimal strategies for both players and can be solved in…

In imperfect-information games, agents must make decisions based on partial knowledge of the game state. The Belief Stochastic Game model addresses this challenge by delegating state estimation to the game model itself. This allows agents…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…

Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…