相关论文: Strategic timing of arrivals to a queueing system …

We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…

We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers, e.g., an airplane boarding system. Arriving early induces a higher waiting cost (waiting before…

This paper considers a discrete-time single-server queue with a single acceptance period for a Poissonian population of homogeneous customers. Customers are served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis, and their service times are…

We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…

We consider a queueing facility where customers decide when to arrive. All customers have the same desired arrival time (w.l.o.g.\ time zero). There is one server, and the service times are independent and exponentially distributed. The…

Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…

We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision…

A single server commences its service at time zero every day. A random number of customers decide when to arrive to the system so as to minimize the waiting time and tardiness costs. The costs are proportional to the waiting time and the…

We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…

We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…

Consider a population of customers each of which needs to decide independently when to arrive to a facility that provides a service during a fixed period of time, say a day. This is a common scenario in many service systems such as a bank,…

We consider a Markovian clearing queueing system, where the customers are accumulated according to a Poisson arrival process and the server removes all present customers at the completion epochs of exponential service cycles. This system…

Motivated by applications such as urban traffic control and make-to-order systems, we study a fluid model of a single-server, on-off system that can accommodate multiple queues. The server visits each queue in order: when a queue is served,…

Queueing networks are typically modelled assuming that the arrival process is exogenous, and unaffected by admission control, scheduling policies, etc. In many situations, however, users choose the time of their arrival strategically,…

Traditionally, research focusing on the design of routing and staffing policies for service systems has modeled servers as having fixed (possibly heterogeneous) service rates. However, service systems are generally staffed by people.…

We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice…

Strategic customer behavior is strongly influenced by the level of information that is provided to customers. Hence, to optimize the design of queueing systems, many studies consider various versions of the same service model and compare…

Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…

We consider an M/G/1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We study the Nash equilibrium profile among customers, and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision…

This paper studies the equilibrium behavior of customers in the Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple working vacations. The arriving customers decide whether to join or to balk the queueing systems based on the information of the queue…