相关论文: Infinite Horizon Markov Economies
In this paper we study the problem of information sharing among rational self-interested agents as a dynamic game of asymmetric information. We assume that the agents imperfectly observe a Markov chain and they are called to decide whether…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
This paper considers two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. The study focuses on the challenging settings where the value function or the model is parameterized by general function classes. Provably…
We study multi-agent general-sum Markov games with nonlinear function approximation. We focus on low-rank Markov games whose transition matrix admits a hidden low-rank structure on top of an unknown non-linear representation. The goal is to…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
Softmax policy gradient is a popular algorithm for policy optimization in single-agent reinforcement learning, particularly since projection is not needed for each gradient update. However, in multi-agent systems, the lack of central…
We study a family of mean field games arising in modeling the behavior of strategic economic agents which move across space maximizing their utility from consumption and have the possibility to accumulate resources for production (such as…
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…
We investigate an infinite-horizon time-inconsistent mean-field game (MFG) in a discrete time setting. We first present a classic equilibrium for the MFG and its associated existence result. This classic equilibrium aligns with the…
This paper presents a class of evolutive Mean Field Games with multiple solutions for all time horizons T and convex but non-smooth Hamiltonian H, as well as for smooth H and T large enough. The phenomenon is analyzed in both the PDE and…
This paper considers the theoretical, computational, and econometric properties of continuous time dynamic discrete choice games with stochastically sequential moves, introduced by Arcidiacono, Bayer, Blevins, and Ellickson (2016). We…
This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new…
We extend the construction of equilibria for linear-quadratic and mean-variance portfolio problems available in the literature to a large class of mean-field time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous time. Our approach…
We show that an N-person non-cooperative semi-Markov game under limiting ratio average pay-off has a pure semi-stationary Nash equilibrium. In an earlier paper, the zero-sum two person case has been dealt with. The proof follows by reducing…
We extend anytime constraints to the Markov game setting and the corresponding solution concept of an anytime-constrained equilibrium (ACE). Then, we present a comprehensive theory of anytime-constrained equilibria that includes (1) a…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
Finite-horizon linear quadratic (LQ) games admit a unique Nash equilibrium, while infinite-horizon settings may have multiple. We clarify the relationship between these two cases by interpreting the finite-horizon equilibrium as a nonlinear…
While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has produced numerous algorithms that converge to Nash or related equilibria, such equilibria are often non-unique and can exhibit widely varying efficiency. This raises a fundamental…
In this paper we describe an approach to resolve strategic games in which players can assume different types along the game. Our goal is to infer which type the opponent is adopting at each moment so that we can increase the player's odds.…
Reach-avoid differential games play an important role in collision avoidance, motion planning and control of aircrafts, and related applications. The central problem is the computation of the set of initial states from which the ego player…